Intelligence Reform Model as A Bridge to The Inflexibility of Bureaucracy Reforms Implementation in The State Intelligence Agency

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Abstract. Every state intelligence organization is faced with the same problem in maintaining a balance between demands for accountability and openness with the confidentiality principle possessed by intelligence. The bureaucratic reform policy that forces all government agencies to apply the same standards, some of which are considered too rigid if implemented in the state intelligence agency. Several criteria for assessing bureaucratic reform actually contradict the need for intelligence reform at the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), which is slowly tending to erode intelligence professionalism and secrecy to become more open, and have an impact on the weakening of the intelligence work system. This research will bridge the implementation of bureaucratic reform policies with the intelligence reform model so that the two can go hand in hand and strengthen each other. The method used in this research is the Systematic Literature Review (SLR) of journal articles published in the 2014-2019 period. Intelligence reform modeling is compiled based on the Research Question (RQ) related to policy objectives and intelligence typology. The results obtained from this study indicate that reform in intelligence organizations cannot be fully assessed using an evaluation worksheet of the implementation of bureaucratic reform, but rather prioritizes the ideal intelligence structure, intelligence secrecy, special surveillance, intelligence coordination, and effectiveness of intelligence operations. This research needs to be interpreted as merely a form of commitment and seriousness of researchers to participate in efforts to build a more professional intelligence community following the principles of democracy, upholding law, and human rights.

Keywords: Bureaucratic; Intelligence Reform; Intelligence Model.

INTRODUCTION

The demands for reform have forced the government bureaucracy to be free from all forms of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN), capable of showing high performance, and providing excellent service to the community, including in the defense and security sector, which includes intelligence organizations. In addition to implementing bureaucratic reform, intelligence organizations are also required to carry out intelligence reform, namely efforts to significantly improve state intelligence officials (intelligence community) to increase effectiveness, make community members more competitive, correct past intelligence failures, and form intelligence community structures. ideal (Lowenthal, 2009).
Defense and security reform in Indonesia can be said to be the embryo of the birth of intelligence reform. In its implementation, reforms in the defense and security sector have been running slower than the acceleration in reforms in the political, economic, financial, and legal fields. So that the echo is inferior to the bureaucratic reform that has been institutionally implemented since 2004, followed by a national simultaneous implementation in all government agencies since 2010 after the enactment of a road map for change through Presidential Regulation Number 81 of 2010 concerning Grand Design of Bureaucratic Reform 2010-2025. Meanwhile, intelligence reform has only started one year after the enactment of Law Number 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence, from which time the government has succeeded in providing clear guidelines and directions regarding the limits of intelligence authority in carrying out its duties and functions, to secrecy and sanctions. firm for anyone who leaked it.

Not many people know the concept of intelligence reform. Meanwhile, many people confuse bureaucratic reform with intelligence reform and think that with intelligence organizations claiming to participate in the implementation of the national bureaucratic reform program, it is sufficient to respond to demands that intelligence has transformed. However, this research will further present the fact that the two reforms have different objectives, some of their components are slightly contradictory, and the evaluation techniques used have not fully paid attention to the differences in character and specificity possessed by each government agency, such as those found in intelligence organizations on the principle of confidentiality in each performance of his duties.

Grand Design of Bureaucratic Reform (GDBR) is a master plan containing the direction of policy implementation for the 2010-2025 period, which is expected to be a guide so that its implementation can run effectively, efficiently, measurably, consistently, integrated, institutionalized, and also sustainable. Entering the last period of the GDBR, the implementation of bureaucratic reform has indeed shown a significant impact, especially seen in the ease of access to integrated services through the Public Service Mall program, the efficiency of state spending through the SAKIP evaluation which recommends programs to be more focused and on target, and the use of electronic-based government systems in motion. Open Government Partnership. However, the gap between current conditions and GDBR's policy objectives is still wide open, which is evident from the increasing number of corruption cases and state financial losses, overlapping regional central affairs in handling the Covid-19 pandemic, to the current ASN (State Civil Service) radicalism. more and more mushrooms. The results of the evaluation of the implementation of bureaucratic reform carried out by the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kemenpan-RB) against the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), also show an increase in the quality
of changes from year to year. However, from the research results, it is known that in the implementation, several things were contradicting the needs of BIN in implementing intelligence reform.

In the constitutional concept, the position of intelligence is always placed close to policy makers, because intelligence is tasked with fulfilling all information needs in decision making, influencing policies, and ensuring the implementation of policies as well as anticipating actual and potential threats (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002). In the policy formulation process, intelligence is at least involved in providing data and situation analysis that is used as the basis for designing policies, minimizing uncertainty in decision making, helping to understand the complexity of problems, and providing estimates of the effects that will occur on policies (DCAF, 2003).

The close relationship between intelligence and policy makers makes it very vulnerable to be used as a tool to maintain power and weaken or discredit political opponents so that intelligence is often considered as opposition and less popular in the study of democracy (Caparini, 2014), plus many countries with a historical legacy of authoritarian rule are involved. incised a dark record for the world of intelligence (Stan & Zulean, 2018). In addition to improving the image of an intelligence organization in the eyes of the public, intelligence reform generally starts from the desire to correct its weaknesses or inability to keep up with the complexity of the growing threats. Like the intelligence reform in Japan that began in 1998 after the territory was passed several ballistic missile tests conducted by North Korea, this is considered as an intelligence failure in gathering information that resulted in the Japanese government's delay in anticipating threats to its country (Kobayashi, 2015).

Each country chooses a different path to initiate reform in order to democratize its intelligence. Spain chose to completely overhaul the intelligence organization and build it from scratch, by dissolving the old intelligence and replacing it with an entirely new organization (Matei, García & Halladay, 2018). Chile has opted for a more subtle approach by formally apologizing to the public for past government atrocities involving intelligence and starting over by hearing input from the public (Matei & García, 2017). Intelligence reform in Argentina through a formal process of prosecuting agents who were perpetrators of past human rights violations (Matei & García, 2019).

The concept of intelligence reform in Chile uses the theory of civil-military relations, where the measurement variables consist of control (supervision), organizational effectiveness, and intelligence culture (Matei & García, 2017). Chilean intelligence reform began with the end of the dictatorship of General Agusto Pinochet and the country began transitioning to democracy in 1988.
The reforms were carried out by balancing organizational effectiveness with public demands for transparency and accountability, as well as demands from politicians to develop a culture of intelligence. The Chilean intelligence reform process was marked by intimidation from military actors to civilian intelligence agencies who were competing to get closer to the President, this has resulted in a polemic of the difficulty of realizing synergy between the intelligence community. Chile’s intelligence reform is a case of slow civil-military relations but has succeeded in erasing the negative stigma. On the other hand, there are weaknesses in the control mechanism, due to the lack of guidance and direction from the President in the steps for change.

Defense and security sector reform with a civil-military relations approach in a democratic government system originates from Huntington's classic work, The Soldier and the State, which emphasizes the importance of demarcation between civilian and military authorities (Ringgi, 2014). This concept has drawn criticism from several researchers in the defense and security sector, including Thomas C. Bruneau, who said that the civil-military relations approach formulated by Huntington was a serious mistake. There are at least three weaknesses, first is the argument and the tautological logic; second is the use of selective data, and third is that this approach has resulted in tensions between the two parties (Bruneau, 2018).

Intelligence Reform in Tunisia puts forward control mechanism variables, strengthening strategic planning, strengthening institutions, professionalism, and resources (Matei & Kawar, 2020). Intelligence reform began in 2011 following the authoritarian regime of Zine al-Abidine bin Ali, an intelligence agent who came to power through a military coup. Tunisian intelligence reform was marked by the disbanding of the old intelligence agency and forming a new institution with a role and mission in more organized strategic planning, building coordination concepts, and developing cooperation mechanisms with international intelligence. These reforms are said to have not been successful enough because Tunisia is still busy with cross-border threats such as Al-Qaeda, civil war, and the assassination of domestic political actors.

Intelligence reform in Spain is measured by the dimension of supervision, which is assessed from the variables of monitoring mechanisms, negligence, and professional norms, and the dimensions of effectiveness as assessed from the variables of strategic planning, institutions, and resources (Matei, García & Halladay, 2018). The complexities of the problems faced, ranging from coordination, supervision, and corruption, color the journey of intelligence reform in Spain. The legislature and the media are given a big role in overseeing the performance of intelligence, including the tightness of the policy framework built for intelligence authority. The reason for the impediments to reform efforts is that the intelligence culture and ethics have not yet been
developed. The legacy of an authoritarian regime remains in intelligence and the lack of regulations regarding the limits on the behavior of intelligence personnel makes conflicts, intelligence leakage, and corruption inevitable.

In contrast to Chile, Tunisia, and Spain, intelligence reform in Japan is measured by the correlation method to assess the relationship between the effectiveness of intelligence work and the number of meetings between the Prime Minister's intelligence (Kobayashi, 2015). Intelligence reform began in 2000 based on the need to keep pace with the rapidly changing strategic environment and spectrum of threats. Intelligence reform is built with an effective institutional mechanism between intelligence and the Prime Minister as the policy maker and improves intelligence capabilities in early detection and early prevention. Intelligence reform was declared successful because in the end there was an increase in the effectiveness of intelligence work, which was influenced by the improvement in the quality of the relationship and the prime minister's trust in intelligence. In this case, Japan-only sees the quality of the relationship from the increasing number of meetings from year to year including regular, bilateral, and multilateral meetings, but does not touch on key intelligence issues and problems such as intelligence politicization, weaknesses in analysis, and control mechanisms.

Intelligence Reform in Indonesia is more directed to avoid recurring failures and mistakes in the state administration system that have happened before, as well as to restore public confidence from past repressive practices in the current democracy frame. In the pre-reform era, in Indonesia the term "black intelligence" was known, a connotation used in the Constitutional Court (MK) Decision Number 7 / PUU-X / 2012 on judicial review of the State Intelligence Law in 2012, namely intelligence practices that tended to operate to protect the ruling regime in various ways. At that time, the autonomy granted to intelligence organizations was very high because their authority was not regulated and limited by law, so that various national media often described abusive practices committed by intelligence, such as the case of the murder of human rights activist Munir and the case of counterfeit money (D. Mengko, et al., 2016). The Constitutional Court's decision also stated that the intelligence and military were involved in human rights violations in separatist operations in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, the Malari incident, the Tanjung Priok incident, the Talangsari case, the mysterious shooting case (Petrus), and the 1998 activist disappearance case. According to Stanley (2006) intelligence in the New Order era also had great authority and power in the field of law enforcement. The high level of intervention is illustrated by the large number of arrests of people without a warrant, detention without trial, torture and inhuman forms of interrogation, manipulation of court procedures, and harassment of former political prisoners. Meanwhile, the supervision that
is being carried out is fairly weak, it does not even show that there is room for criticism by the public and other institutions to correct the extensive abuse of intelligence authority. From its inception in 1945, the diction of internal supervision was only discovered in the policy of establishing BAKIN based on Presidential Decree No. 70 of 1967, where previously the supervision was carried out by the BAKIN Chief of Staff. Internal supervision is carried out by a special supervisory unit such as the new inspectorate known in 1981 under the Deputy Head of BAKIN, and fully transformed and formalized into the Main Inspectorate since 2000 based on Presidential Decree No. by external and other parties, except directly by the Head of State as intelligence user, however, this form of supervision tends to be subjective because basically intelligence is ordered in secret by the head of state, and this cycle has the potential for abuse of authority.

Intelligence Reform in Indonesia is not like bureaucratic reform, which is explicitly written in formal policies, regarding the clarity of direction, targets, and targets for change, but intelligence reform is believed to be an effort to realize professional intelligence, change the intelligence system in line with democratic principles, and regulate intelligence. intelligence authority so as not to violate the law and human rights (Rismanto, 2005. Intelligence reform can only be carried out when the level of threat to the state is relatively moderate to minor so that intelligence can focus more on mobilizing change innovation and resources for organizational strengthening. For this reason, the concept of intelligence reform which is very sensitive will vary according to the goals and needs of the country, as well as the right time to start.

METHODS

The paradigm or approach used in this research is the postpositivist paradigm. Qualitative data collection techniques, obtained through in-depth interviews and Systematic Literature Review (SLR). Interviews were conducted with informants who are competent in their fields, consisting of Professor of the State Intelligence College, National Defense Defense Professionals, Secretary of the State Intelligence Bill Discussion Committee, Member of Commission I DPR-RI for the 1999-2014 period, Director of NGOs and Political Observers, Minister of Social Affairs 2014-2015, and members of the intelligence community whose identities are protected by the State Intelligence Law. Meanwhile, SLR is used to identify, review, evaluate, and interpret available research on the same theme, through the criteria of relevant questions. There were 13 journal articles that met the criteria and published in the 2014-2019 period, discussing intelligence reform and intelligence secrecy. The information obtained is then grouped into several keywords in table 1:
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<th>NO</th>
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<td>Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR)</td>
<td>Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies</td>
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<td>International Journal of Intelligence and</td>
<td>Intelligence Reform in Brazil: A Long, Drawn-Out Process</td>
<td>Thomas C. Bruneau</td>
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<td>International Journal of Intelligence and</td>
<td>Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community</td>
<td>Yoshiki Kobayashi</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>International Journal of Intelligence and</td>
<td>Albania’s Intelligence after Hoxha: The Cat’s Grin and Hidden Claws</td>
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<td>2016</td>
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<td>Poland’s Attempts to Develop a Democratic and Effective Intelligence System,</td>
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<td>Reconciling Democracy and the Protection of State Secrets in South Africa</td>
<td>Stephane Lefebvre</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>International Journal of Intelligence and</td>
<td>Chilean Intelligence after Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious</td>
<td>Florina C. Matei, Andrés de</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Media and Communication</td>
<td>Intelligence Reform and the Snowden Paradox: The Case of France</td>
<td>Felix Treguer</td>
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<td>Defense &amp; Security Analysis</td>
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<td>On Balance: Intelligence Democratization in Post-Franco Spain</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Surveillance and Society</td>
<td>Intelligence Sector Reforms in Romania: A Scorecard</td>
<td>Lavinia Stan &amp; Marian Zulean</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Intelligence Reform, Democracy, Human rights, Intelligence surveillance</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>International Journal of Intelligence and</td>
<td>Evaluating Ghana’s Intelligence Oversight Regime</td>
<td>Patrick P. Obuobi</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Intelligence Reform, Democracy, Intelligence surveillance</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>International Journal of Intelligence and</td>
<td>Tunisia’s Post–Arab Spring Intelligence Reform</td>
<td>Florina Cristiana Matei &amp; Jumana</td>
<td>2019</td>
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Source: Secondary Data Processing
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

- Challenges for Secrecy and Intelligence Professionalism

As stipulated in Law Number 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence (State Intelligence Law), BIN serves as the coordinator for other state intelligence administrators such as TNI intelligence, Polri, Attorney General's Office, and K / L intelligence such as immigration, tax, and Kesbangpol intelligence. In principle, these institutions have been regulated to have a specificity, namely confidentiality which is placed as the main condition in realizing their work effectiveness. Therefore it can be said that intelligence organizations have very different characteristics from other public organizations.

If a single leakage of intelligence secrets occurs, it is believed that it will destroy public confidence in the government as a whole and the reforms and perceptions that have been built could be destroyed instantly. As happened after the disclosure of the secret PRISM program in the US by Edward Snowden, an agent of the National Security Agency (NSA), (Tréguer, 2017). This means that even the smallest information that comes out of the state intelligence agency can be used by the opposing party to create a kind of information mosaic and use it to fight and undermine the authority of the state.

Of the 8 (eight) areas of change that were evaluated based on the measuring instrument of the Regulation of the Minister for Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Reform Number 26 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for the Evaluation of the Implementation of Bureaucratic Reform, not all criteria contradict the principles and principles of intelligence, at least the areas of change management, policy deregulation, structuring management and public services can be fulfilled by BIN without debate.

First, the problem lies in the area of accountability, where BIN must be able to maintain a balance between the need to remain accountable while maintaining the confidentiality of intelligence. Democracy and bureaucratic reform, which demand transparency in the public sector budget down to the program and activity level, in their assessment have not given specific space to BIN and state intelligence administrators, so this can result in all forms of BIN's activities and strengths easily read by opponents. For example, in the evaluation of the Government Agency Performance Accountability System (SAKIP) which is measured by reference to the Regulation of the Minister for Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Reform Number 12 of 2015 concerning Guidelines for Evaluating the Implementation of the Performance Accountability System for Government Agencies, there is an assessment indicator that all SAKIP documents are such as strategic planning documents, annual performance plans, performance agreements, and
performance reports that must be published. Thus the opposing party and even the general public will easily read how strong the budget is allocated for counter-radicalism activities, how many times intelligence operations are used to deal with separatism, the number of intelligence reports, what targets have been successfully realized each quarter, what weaknesses and obstacles BIN is facing, to focus and policy direction in intelligence activities in dealing with potential threats.

The use of a budget following the principles of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy is also a difficult condition to formulate for intelligence organizations. This relates to several logical challenges in measuring the level of intelligence efficiency because no conceptualization can adequately explain if efficiency is linked to national security and defense objectives. Intelligence activities are so diverse that they touch all aspects of life, they are usually sudden and cannot be planned in detail, it is difficult to set a unit price in every activity of investigation, security, and mobilization, and work results that are not physically visible so that satisfaction with their performance is difficult to measure. The concept of efficiency in the intelligence world is often found to be inversely related to the concept of effectiveness.

At the statutory level, it can also be seen that the regulation on the obligation to maintain confidentiality is stipulated in a statutory level policy, while the SAKIP assessment guidelines are regulated in a PANRB Ministerial Regulation. On this basis, policies at the level of a Ministerial Regulation should be formulated by taking into account the harmony of other regulations both vertically and horizontally, so that an ideal model of intelligence accountability is obtained from a different point of view from accountability in other public organizations.

Second, in the area of HR management system structuring. It can also be said that the policies currently in place are not fully in favor of intelligence professionals. The challenge in maintaining the confidentiality of the identities of state intelligence personnel has started since the recruitment of Candidates for State Civil Servants (CASN) which are publicly announced through the website, this will certainly create loopholes for leakage, which can be used by opponents to obtain information and ultimately weaken the intelligence work system. At least the leakage of the names of CASN BIN personnel had occurred twice before the discretion of the Head of the State Personnel Agency was finally enforced not to publicly announce the results of CASN graduation at BIN and several other state intelligence administrators. It is not enough, the classic problem that occurs in almost every government agency is the limited formation, and several times the CASN procurement moratorium policy has been imposed which has made the gap between ideal needs and bezetting even farther. Human resource management which requires a slight difference if accompanied by providing sufficient space for BIN will of course has a significant impact on results.
This is evident from the results of the merit system index assessment carried out by the State Civil Apparatus Commission (KASN) in 2020, where BIN managed to get a score of 322 or the "Good" category, which also places BIN as the first rank in the application of the merit system in the category of government institutions non-ministerial.

Third, in the area of organizational strengthening, the problem is found that the ideal structure in an intelligence organization cannot be equated with other organizations known as poor structures with rich functions, but an intelligence structure that is always adjusted to the development of the spectrum of threats to security and the integrity of the state. This means that if globalization brings the country to face a new type of threat, intelligence must swiftly form a special unit and fill it with competent human resources and new business processes to ward off these threats.

The current BIN organizational structure continues to be developed according to the dynamics of the strategic environment both internally, such as the need for human resource development through the strengthening of STIN to produce capable intelligence agents, as well as global, regional, and national influences such as the emergence of a spectrum of new threats in the economic, cyber, and economic aspects. ASN radicalism began to increase with the entry of outside understandings or ideologies that were against Pancasila. However, with the current organizational structure, there is still the potential for overlapping functions and task fields, because the operational unit at BIN was not formed with a focus on the Pancagatra aspects (ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, and defense and security) as stated in the State Intelligence Law.

Fourth, The challenge that BIN also faces in maintaining its confidentiality and professionalism lies in the area of strengthening supervision. The government procurement mechanism, which is also required to be carried out openly, will be a valuable guide for opposing parties who are always waiting for opportunities by calculating the intelligence strength of the type of equipment purchased by BIN. This risk will have an impact on the destruction of the intelligence system if the providers of goods/services selected through the auction mechanism are disappointed parties and are not in line with the interests of the state. In this area of supervision, it was also found that the fact that more and more assessment teams alternated, would only make BIN more open and erode the principle of confidentiality. Currently, the supervision carried out on BIN consists of 7 actors divided into 3 active, regular, and formally bound supervisory actors, and 4 supervisory actors who are passive.

The problem is that no less than 10 (ten) teams come simultaneously in one year, meaning that no less than 50 supervisors or investigators in one year legally come to BIN headquarters,
know intelligence processes and activities through interviews and read intelligence documents, as well as interacting intensely with BIN employees. This challenge is the most vulnerable because supervisors are never sworn in to safeguard intelligence secrets, namely whatever they see, read and hear in the surveillance process. For this reason, it is very important to have an audit with a special mechanism that is applied to BIN and other state intelligence administering institutions, with a permanent membership of the supervisory team, and to take an oath first and through background screening.

- **Intelligence Reform Model Towards a Professional BIN**

  However, BIN must continue to carry out both reforms, both bureaucratic reform and intelligence reform, which have intersections but have different policy objectives. Intelligence reform aims to create intelligence professionalism, a democratic work system, and respect law and human rights. Meanwhile, bureaucratic reform to create good and clean governance has several indicators, namely: (i) a clean and accountable bureaucracy; (ii) capable bureaucracy; and (iii) excellent public service.

  Peter Gill (1994) creates a model for the relationship of the modern state to its intelligence. According to him, intelligence is classified based on the level of power it has measured by the level of autonomy and supervision, and the level of penetration of society, and the way intelligence collects information and acts. The classification referred to is, firstly, “domestic intelligence bureau”, which is intelligence with limited and specific powers regulated by law, whose main function is to collect information and prosecute criminal cases of security breaches, without taking aggressive retaliation against citizens. The second “political police”, in this typology, intelligence has greater autonomy from policy makers, is more isolated from supervisory actors, and serves exclusively the political elite or the ruling party. Usually focuses on intelligence gathering and aggressive countermeasures on opposition groups. Third, the "independent security state", marked by weak supervision of intelligence activities, so that intelligence can determine its own goals even though it is against the interests of the state. On this basis, the ideal measurement of intelligence reform based on policy objectives consists of at least 2 (two) dimensions, namely the dimensions of objectives and typology.
In this intelligence reform model, there are 5 (five) variables consisting of 3 variables in the goal dimension and 2 variables in the typology dimension. The objective dimension is based on the objectives of the intelligence reform policy which consists of variables of professionalism, the democratic system, as well as law and human rights. Meanwhile, the typology dimension is based on the model of the relationship between the modern state and its intelligence, which consists of the variables of autonomy and penetration.

First, the professionalism variable, which can be characterized by several indicators, namely: (i) the ideal state intelligence organizational structure; (ii) special human resource management which is a combination of unique competencies and high loyalty; (iii) effective budget management; and (iv) confidentiality which is regulated and the imposition of sanctions for those who leak.

Second, the variable of the democratic system, which can be characterized by several indicators, namely: (i) the election system for the head of BIN; (ii) leadership style of the Head of BIN; and (iii) political neutrality.

Third, law and human rights variables, which can be characterized by indicators of controversial statements and actions and completeness of regulations. Controversial statements and actions not only originated from BIN but also other parties related to the state intelligence function.

Fourth, the autonomy variable which talks about the balance between the duties of BIN as an implementing organization, as well as a state intelligence coordinator with considerable authority towards its compliance with the supervision, carried out by other actors. At least the autonomy variable can be divided into indicators of active supervision and passive supervision.

Fifth, the penetration variable talks about the level of penetration in the use of intelligence by the Head of State. This variable can be divided into intelligence tradecraft indicators and state intelligence coordination. Intelligence tradecraft can be assessed from the accuracy of the use of...
intelligence systems, methods, techniques, and technology in gathering information, as well as ways of acting that do not violate legal provisions, democratic principles, and human rights. One of the causes for the failure of intelligence reform is high penetration without being matched by strong supervision, so that intelligence is still trapped in the old paradigm and forgets respect for human rights (Stan & Zulean, 2018). In this variable, it is also important to see the effectiveness of the intelligence cycle in the process of defining strategic intelligence information. The intelligence cycle can refer to Mark Lowenthal's seven-stage cycle consisting of request, collection, process and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, consumption, and feedback (Lowenthal, 2009).

- Bureaucratic Reform Strengthens Intelligence Reform.

The current assessment criteria for bureaucratic reform can be said to be too broad and not yet fully results-oriented, which focuses on policy objectives, because it still gives considerable weight to the components of the process. If bureaucratic reform refers to its policy objectives, the assessment can only focus on 3 things, namely concrete efforts to eradicate corruption, implementation of performance-based budgets, and excellent public services. Bureaucratic reform policies cannot turn a blind eye and need to see the need for space for differences in the direction of change for each entity, which in turn can also provide flexibility to state intelligence administering organizations.

Figure 2. Model of Bureaucratic Reform in State Intelligence Administrators

One of the ways that bureaucratic reform and intelligence reform can go hand in hand and strengthen each other, is by differentiating assessment forms in the evaluation of bureaucratic reform based on aspects of the task and field of service, as well as giving different assessment weights by referring to priority programs and how much the impact of these aspects of the task on
national development. As with the reform of the bureaucracy in state intelligence administrators, apart from eliminating criteria that are contradictory to intelligence principles and principles, intelligence reform variables can be added, namely the assessment of intelligence professionalism, respect for intelligence activities towards law, democratic principles, and human rights. If the indicators of success and assessment are equated for each entity, the reforms that appear on the surface are merely efforts to fulfill the documents that are the criteria for assessment but do not significantly change the mindset and performance of national development.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the results of the study, it was concluded that BIN still had to carry out bureaucratic reform with the same evaluation worksheets as other organizations, except for criteria related to intelligence confidentiality. Therefore, for the sake of clarity and so as not to cause debate, it is necessary to change the evaluation mechanism for bureaucratic reform and synchronize all policies in the implementation of bureaucratic reform which considers the specific characteristics of BIN as an organizer of state intelligence. Another option that arises from the special condition of BIN as an intelligence organization is to change the measurement tool for evaluating bureaucratic reform to be more universal so that it can be fulfilled by all public organizations including state intelligence organizations. To achieve a balance there will always be tension between the need to maintain national security and the need for performance and financial accountability. Ideally, the completeness of policy infrastructure and implementation of bureaucratic reform will still be more inclined towards secrecy, because the obligation to maintain intelligence secrecy is protected by the State Intelligence Law, while bureaucratic reform, SAKIP, and its measuring instruments are regulated in policies at the same level as a Presidential Regulation and Regulation of the Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform. The assessment using the intelligence reform model will bridge several problem points found in the assessment of bureaucratic reform. This will prove to the public that BIN as the coordinator of state intelligence administrators in Indonesia has its own way of showing to the international community that the change in intelligence to an advanced and professional organization is a necessity with a measure following the principles of state intelligence.

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